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U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT TO THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE

References:
Enclosure C

1. Purpose. This instruction provides procedures for planning and executing U.S. military support to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), as directed by the Secretary of War (reference (a)). When authorized, the U.S. military will support the PSI by conducting activities that support the U.S. Government's (USG's) capacity-building of PSI partner nations to improve their national operational capabilities and domestic legal authorities to interdict weapons of mass destruction (WMD), WMD delivery systems, and WMD-related materials. This includes the planning and execution of PSI activities (Enclosure A). This instruction implements references (a)–(e).

2. Superseded/Cancellation. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Instruction 3520.02C, 24 May 2019, "Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Activity Program" is hereby superseded.

3. Applicability. This instruction applies to the Joint Staff, Services, and Combatant Commands (CCMDs), and to Combat Support Agencies who report to, or through, the CJCS. Copies are provided to the Office of the Secretary of War (OSW) for information and use as appropriate.

4. Background

a. The History of the Proliferation Security Initiative

(1) In May 2003, the United States and 10 other states launched the PSI to address the proliferation of WMD. In September 2003, this group of like-minded states developed and endorsed the *PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles* (SOIP) (reference (b)).

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The Proliferation Security Initiative Statement of Interdiction Principles reflects a commitment by endorsing states to establish a more coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop shipments of weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, including the United Nations Security Council.

Figure 1. Proliferation Security Initiative Statement of Interdiction Principles

(2) As of March 2025, 116 states made a political commitment to endorse the PSI SOIP.

b. The PSI International Framework. The PSI is a multinational effort intended to complement and support counterproliferation-interdiction operations by providing a voluntary framework through which PSI partner nations declare their political will to conduct WMD-related interdictions, and who then work to improve national operational capabilities and domestic legal authorities. PSI is both a deterrence and capacity-building effort that serves as a catalyst for real-world interdiction and international coordination. However, other governments may organize interdiction activities differently and could refer to counterproliferation-interdiction operations within an operational PSI context.

c. Reference (c) emphasizes that the proliferation and use of WMD and their delivery systems is among the most serious threats facing the United States and the international community and states that the United States will continue to demonstrate leadership in securing, detecting, interdicting, attributing, protecting from, and disposing of WMD, WMD delivery systems, and related material, and in helping other countries to do the same.

5. Role of the Department of War in the Proliferation Security Initiative

a. Degrading actor capability to develop, acquire, or use WMD is a priority objective of the CJCS in support of reference (d). PSI is an effective deterrence and capacity-building and messaging tool through which the USG pursues national countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) priorities and encourages and supports the enhancement of the capacity of our partners. PSI is an important low-cost effort that leverages international partnerships and relationships to advance mutual national security interests. Amid the broad possibility of dual-use technology and resources surreptitiously feeding WMD activities in a world of porous borders, PSI's global reach expands the depth of the homeland's defense from WMD attack.

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b. OSW provides guidance and sets priorities for Department of War (DoW) activities and efforts related to PSI. These priorities are intended to shape DoW support to PSI engagements, exercises and workshops over a 3-year cycle.

6. Proliferation Security Initiative Activities. PSI activities demonstrate a collective commitment to act against proliferation-related shipments, send a strong signal of deterrence to would-be proliferators, enhance interdiction capabilities of our partners, increase the political will of PSI-endorsing states to conduct interdictions, and extend outreach to non-endorsing states. PSI activities involve the interaction of representatives with a broad range of disciplines (e.g., military, customs/law enforcement, maritime, CWMD, intelligence, financial, legal, and diplomatic) from U.S. and partner nation organizations. PSI is a national security activity that prevents chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) and dual-use threats from reaching U.S. borders, increases interoperability, and increases burden sharing amongst endorsees. General coordination responsibilities for U.S. military support to the PSI are outlined in Enclosure A. Specific tasks and responsibilities for PSI activities are detailed in Enclosure B.

7. Responsibilities. See Enclosure B.

8. Summary of Changes. This revision clarifies the roles of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the CCMDs. It clarifies and prioritizes certain types of activities within the PSI (Enclosure A). It updates the position of PSI within the context of strategic guidance (references (c)–(e)). It also further defines the coordination of activities between the Joint Staff and other entities (Enclosure B).

9. Releasability. UNRESTRICTED. This directive is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited on the Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET). DoW components (to include the CCMDs) and other Federal agencies may obtain copies of this directive through the Internet from the CJCS Directives Electronic Library at <<https://dod365.sharepoint-mil.us/sites/JS-Matrix-DEL/SitePages/Home.aspx>>. Joint Staff activities may also obtain access via the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) electronic library web sites.

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10. Effective Date. This INSTRUCTION is effective upon signature.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



PAUL C. SPEDERO, Jr., RADM, USN
Vice Director, Joint Staff

Enclosures

- A – U.S. Military Support to the Proliferation Security Initiative
- B – Roles and Responsibilities for U.S. Military Support to the Proliferation Security Initiative
- C – References

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DISTRIBUTION

Distribution A, B, and C plus the following:

Assistance Secretary of War for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical, and Biological
Defense Policy and Programs

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ENCLOSURE A

U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT TO THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE

1. Responsibilities. Specific responsibilities are outlined in Enclosure B.
2. General. This enclosure provides guidance for U.S. military support to the PSI. States participating in the PSI have committed to improving national operational capabilities to interdict WMD and WMD-related materials, and are developing solutions to national and international policy and legal barriers to preventing WMD proliferation. PSI activities demonstrate a collective commitment to act against proliferation-related shipments, send a strong signal of deterrence to would-be proliferators, increase the political will of PSI-endorsing nations to interdict WMD and WMD-related materials, enable countries to meet with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 and international arms control commitments, and extend outreach to non-endorsing nations that observe the activity. PSI strengthens U.S. CCMD capabilities and interoperability with partner nations and furthers partners' capacity to detect and interdict WMD and dual-use items away from U.S. borders. Additionally, PSI activities enhance U.S. and partner deterrence efforts. These activities offer an opportunity to provide technical and legal exchanges with PSI partners, bolster political will and resolve to undertake interdiction efforts, and practice national decision-making processes and authorities.
3. Combatant Command Priorities. Critical to the success of the PSI is collaboration with the CCMDs in setting the DoW's PSI fiscal year priorities on a triannual basis. OSW, through the Joint Staff, will request priorities so that CCMDs equities are adequately represented. The CCMDs will provide priority hosts for future events, critical partners to future PSI endeavors, and priority topics of concern for PSI activities.
4. PSI Activity Categories. There are four categories of PSI activities: core activities, embedded activities, exercises, and operational and political oversight meetings. CCMDs normally conduct core and embedded PSI activities. Core PSI activities are preferred over embedding a PSI activity in a broader military exercise. Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) conducting PSI activities should do so consistent with guidance provided in reference (e) and the principles in this instruction.
 - a. Core PSI Activities. These activities include academic seminars, scenario-based tabletop discussions, subject matter expert exchanges, interdiction-related capacity-building exchanges, and interdiction-related capabilities demonstrations. These activities should include PSI as the major topic and be consistent with the

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principles in the PSI SOIP and this instruction. Core PSI activities should include interagency participation and primarily feature a strategic/operational emphasis.

(1) Coordination with Other CWMD Programs. Although core PSI activities are preferred, that should not preclude the inclusion of presentations on or the participation by representatives of other related CWMD programs. PSI activities should be leveraged with other CWMD programs (e.g., International Counterproliferation Program, Cooperative Threat Reduction, and Pacific Security Maritime Exchange) to maximize effectiveness and efficiency in building counterproliferation-interdiction capacity with partner countries. Where appropriate and beneficial, a PSI presentation can be included in an activity of another CWMD program, with an aim of following-up with the partner nation to hold a subsequent PSI activity.

(2) Tone and Design. PSI activities should convey an appropriate strategic message that accurately portrays PSI objectives to participating states and the public. The activities should clearly emphasize that all PSI and counterproliferation-interdiction activities are legal and consistent with participating states' national legal authorities and international legal frameworks. PSI activities should be whole-of-government in approach and participation. Activities should focus on diplomatic, informational, military, and economic tools used to enable interdictions, including the use of military force. Often, the most substantive learning amongst PSI activity participants derives from a tabletop discussion where interagency participants practice strategic and operational rapid decision making and coordination in a scenario-based environment.

(3) Live Demonstration of Capabilities. The live demonstration of PSI and counterproliferation-interdiction capabilities is often the most visible aspect of a PSI activity and can tangibly portray the multinational commitment to the PSI SOIP. Live demonstrations should be included in core PSI events where possible, and can include CBRN identification, mitigation, and decontamination and appropriate equipment usage; or a border-, maritime-, military-, or law enforcement-related capability demonstration. Although more of an operational/tactical activity, live demonstrations gain strategic value, if appropriately publicized, by sending a deterrent message to would-be proliferators. PSI live demonstrations can also build upon current capabilities and improve interoperability.

b. Embedded PSI Activities. These activities involve a PSI or counterproliferation-interdiction capability demonstration (live exercise (LIVEX) or port exercise (PORTEX)) embedded in a broader military exercise. Embedded PSI activities are useful ways to introduce PSI to new or under-engaged partners,

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but should not be a habitual means of engagement in order to meet the basic level of commitment by a CCMD to supporting PSI. Embeds should be reserved for inclusion in exercises with non-PSI-endorsing states to introduce the basic tenets of PSI and to provide a platform to invite them to stand-alone PSI activities, or exercises with PSI-endorsing states as a strategic step toward a bilateral or multi-lateral PSI core activity. Department of State (DOS) coordination is required for any PSI engagement with non-PSI endorsees and should be included in all PSI outreach activities.

c. Exercises

(1) The ability to exercise with partners is critical to the success of PSI. Exercises may be stand-alone or co-located with core PSI activities. Upon a nation committing to host a PSI exercise within an area of responsibility (AOR), DTRA will provide Joint Staff the formal national request at least 6 months prior to the event. The request will be transmitted to the appropriate CCMD via the Automated Message Handling System. The CCMD will allocate assets based on a feasibility of support assessment, and the determination will be transmitted by the CCMD to the Joint Staff Directorate for Strategy Plans and Policy, J-5. Types of exercises may include a LIVEX—an at-sea demonstration of visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) capabilities or air tracking, surveillance, and hail and query capabilities; or a PORTEX—a demonstration of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and equipment for customs inspections and interdictions. Where able, live demonstrations should incorporate a more formal exchange of interdiction-related TTPs between the participating nations, followed by a capability demonstration.

(2) Ideally, PSI exercises will be identified 3 years in advance to support planning timelines and resourcing. These activities should build upon previous years, focusing on topics related to current and emerging threats, and should include activities such as LIVEXs, PORTEXs, and capability demonstrations, where applicable. Operational/tactical activities may be conducted as supporting elements (e.g., capacity-building training or capabilities demonstrations). The activity may cover any combination of maritime, air, or land-border environments and may have bilateral or multilateral participation, with a local, regional, or global focus. CCMDs are responsible for providing and supporting asset requirements for exercises, such as maritime vessels and personnel.

d. Operational and Political Oversight Meetings. Oversight of PSI occurs through Operational Experts Group (OEG) meetings, Mid-Level Political Meetings (MLPM), and High-Level Political Meetings (HLPM). Because CCMD participation in these meetings is generally limited, meeting minutes will be distributed to the CCMDs for situational awareness. However, it is

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recommended that the CCMD of the OEG-hosting country attends this meeting in order to provide additional buy-in to regional planning.

(1) Operational Oversight. OEG meetings involve a select group of endorsing states and are designed to provide operational oversight to the PSI. As a general course of action, OEG members should be invited to multilateral PSI activities in their region, and should be called upon to participate through demonstrations, academic presentations, TTP exchanges, and the facilitation of tabletop discussions. The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of War for Nuclear Deterrence and Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Policy (DASW NCWMD) heads the U.S. delegation to the OEG and determines DoW and interagency participation.

(2) Political Oversight. The MLPM and HLPM are designed to provide political oversight and renew political support to the PSI. The MLPM includes executive director/assistant secretary-level representatives from all endorsing states. The HLPM includes vice minister/under secretary-level representatives from all endorsing states. DOS is the U.S. head of delegation for the MLPM and HLPM and determines U.S. participation. DASW NCWMD determines DoW support to the DOS for the MLPM and HLPM.

5. Coordination

a. CCMDs are responsible for providing initial planning guidance and oversight for PSI activities within their AOR. DTRA is responsible for detailed planning and execution. The Joint Staff and DASW NCWMD will support planning for PSI activities. All requests by CCMDs for non-DoW interagency participation will be coordinated by DASW NCWMD through the Joint Staff. In most cases, the CCMD can coordinate directly with the DTRA PSI Support Cell to facilitate the request.

b. All PSI activities will be placed on the PSI Activities Calendar in accordance with (IAW) Enclosure B. DTRA, in cooperation with the Joint Staff, is responsible for maintaining and distributing the PSI Activities Calendar to CCMDs—including U.S. Special Operations Command as the CWMD Coordinating Authority (CA)—and the U.S. interagency. CCMDs will update DTRA and Joint Staff regarding all PSI activities within their AOR.

6. Funding

a. PSI activities will be supported through CCMD operations and maintenance (O&M) funding whenever possible. CCMDs will budget for program funds for a minimum of one PSI activity per calendar year.

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b. CCDRs Joint Training Exercise Engagement Program funds may be used to support PSI activities conducted by CCDRs as part of their approved Joint Exercise Program (JEP). Additionally, Cooperative Defense Initiative funds may be used for bilateral and multilateral exercises and symposiums, and to fund temporary duty for U.S. military, government personnel, and foreign military of developing countries.

c. Service components will normally utilize existing O&M funding for the deployment, employment, and redeployment of personnel and assets in support of PSI activities, unless other arrangements are made.

d. Through the Joint Staff or DASW NCWMD, other appropriations may be available to fund discrete aspects of PSI activities.

e. DOS manages a funding line for developing country foreign participant travel associated with specific PSI events, which—in coordination with OSD and Joint Staff—may be utilized for PSI activities.

f. Funds to support PSI activities may also be available through the DTRA PSI Support Cell. DTRA's PSI Support Cell also retains the ability to fund limited participant travel on a case-by-case basis.

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ENCLOSURE B

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT TO THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE

1. Joint Staff

a. Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, J-2

(1) Supports Joint Staff-level PSI activity planning and execution as required. This may include assistance with CJCS-level scenario development or outreach to subject-matter experts across the Intelligence Community.

(2) Supports Joint Staff J-5 and DASW NCWMD with requests for intelligence products during PSI strategy development.

b. Joint Staff Directorate for Operations, J-3

(1) Provides military representation to PSI oversight meetings and activities when requested.

(2) Supports PSI activity planning and execution when requested.

(3) Coordinates with operational elements of other USG departments and agencies as required.

c. Joint Staff Directorate for Strategy, Plans, and Policy, J-5

(1) Serves as the Joint Staff OPR for coordination of PSI activities.

(2) Coordinates with DASW NCWMD in providing policy guidance to the CCMDs for PSI activities, including guidance on applicable international agreements related to WMD and counterproliferation.

(3) Provides military representation to PSI oversight meetings and activities as appropriate.

(4) Coordinates with CCMDs for participation of U.S. military forces in PSI activities as required.

(5) Supports PSI activity planning and execution as appropriate.

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(6) Coordinates with other USG departments and agencies as appropriate.

d. Joint Staff Directorate for Joint Force Development, J-7. Considers PSI exercises (stand-alone) or exercises with embedded PSI activities nominated by CCDRs for inclusion into the JEP.

2. Military Services

a. Support PSI activity planning and execution as requested.

b. Coordinate subordinate organizations' participation IAW plans and procedures.

c. Provide personnel and assets in support of PSI activities IAW established procedures as requested.

d. Provide necessary operations, communications, and logistics support IAW established procedures as requested.

3. Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of War for Nuclear Deterrence and Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Policy

a. Serves as the OPR for PSI strategic direction, policy, and interagency and international coordination for DoW.

b. Develops and coordinates policy and guidance for PSI activities with the Joint Staff, DTRA, and the interagency, including guidance on applicable international agreements related to WMD and counterproliferation.

c. In coordination with DOS, Joint Staff, DTRA, CCMDs, and the interagency, develops PSI priorities for each region.

4. Defense Threat Reduction Agency. IAW the direction of the Deputy Secretary of War (reference (e)), maintains a PSI Support Cell, which supports PSI activities conducted IAW Enclosure A. The PSI Support Cell will work closely with Joint Staff and DASW NCWMD to:

a. Serve as the primary DoW organization providing support to DASW NCWMD, Joint Staff, and CCMDs in the development, planning, and execution of U.S.-hosted, U.S. co-hosted, and partner nation-hosted PSI activities.

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b. Ensure PSI and CCMD CWMD and building partner-capacity objectives are incorporated into PSI activities.

c. Coordinate U.S. interagency support for PSI activities.

d. Support foreign partners in planning and executing foreign-hosted PSI activities.

e. Provide PSI and counterproliferation-interdiction subject-matter expertise to other CWMD programs.

f. Maintain the PSI Activities Calendar.

g. Support PSI oversight meetings, including the OEG.

h. Support CCMD PSI activities with funding for discrete activities.

5. U.S. Special Operations Command. As CWMD CA, maintains situational awareness of PSI activities to ensure they support the coordinated DoW effort for CWMD and the Functional Campaign Plan for CWMD.

6. Combatant Commands. CCMDs will host/co-host and fund PSI activities IAW Enclosure A. When planning and executing PSI activities, CCMDs will:

a. Serve as the U.S. lead for U.S.-hosted and co-hosted PSI activities within their AOR, unless otherwise directed by DASW NCWMD.

b. Coordinate with subordinate commands and other participating organizations within the AOR to support PSI activities.

c. Coordinate with DASW NCWMD and Joint Staff for U.S. interagency support for CCMD-led PSI activities.

d. Ensure that PSI activities support the CCMD CWMD and building partner-capacity objectives and DoW PSI objectives.

e. Ensure that PSI activities are considered in the context of how they achieve CCMD campaign plans.

f. Request DTRA PSI Support Cell support as necessary to develop, plan, and execute PSI activities.

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g. Support partner nation-led PSI activities within the AOR, to include planning and execution support, logistics, and resources at the appropriate level.

h. Include PSI activities in the Command and Control of the Information Environment database to promote PSI engagement contributions to campaign plans and offer a repository for lessons and assessments.

7. Functional Combatant Commands. Support PSI activity planning and execution as requested.

8. Other Departments, Agencies, and Activities. DoW PSI activity planners will seek, in coordination with DASW NCWMD, to incorporate major non-DoW departments and agencies into PSI activities, including planning, execution, and subject-matter expertise support, as appropriate.

a. U.S. Department of State. DOS serves as the U.S. lead for PSI policy, outreach, and diplomatic communications through the Office of Counterproliferation Initiatives (CPI) within the Bureau of Arms Control and Nonproliferation. The CPI leads DOS involvement in PSI, to include leading/coordinating PSI activities and bringing additional nations into the initiative.

b. Military Academic Institutions. Military Academic Institutions—such as the National Defense University (NDU), Naval War College (NWC), Naval Post-Graduate School, and Asia-Pacific Center for Strategic Studies—provide strategic-level advice to the Joint Staff and DASW NCWMD, as well as subject-matter expertise. On occasion, these organizations may provide support to PSI activity planning and execution. NDU and NWC, in particular, possess substantial institutional knowledge through longstanding involvement in PSI.

c. U.S. Coast Guard. The U.S. Coast Guard will provide personnel and assets for live demonstrations and exercises such as the PSI LIVEX and the PORTEX through operational capabilities demonstrations, capacity-building subject-matter expertise related to CWMD, interdiction operations in the maritime environment, and VBSS techniques.

d. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Customs and Border Protection (CBP) plays an integral role to the PSI generally, and has historically provided support to DoW-related PSI activities. In addition to subject-matter expertise, CBP provides scenario development and tabletop discussion facilitation. CBP has contributed the majority of U.S. submissions to the library of PSI Critical Capabilities and Practices tools and resources. CBP technical experts assist

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with PSI capacity-building TTP exchanges and capability demonstrations. CBP also provides a direct link to international customs enforcement standards provided through the World Customs Organization.

e. Other U.S. Government Agencies. When requested, several other USG agencies provide subject-matter expertise and other support to planning and executing PSI activities. These agencies may include:

- (1) Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- (2) DHS, Homeland Security Investigations.
- (3) Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration.
- (4) Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security.
- (5) Department of Treasury, Office of Terrorist Financing & Financial Crimes.
- (6) Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counterproliferation and Biosecurity Center.

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REFERENCES

- a. SecDef memo, 8 August 2005, “U.S. Military Support to the Multinational Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Exercise Program and Related Training”
- b. *Proliferation Security Initiative Statement of Interdiction Principles*, September 2003
- c. PPD 42, September 2016, “Preventing and Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation, Terrorism, and Use”
- d. *Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction*, June 2023
- e. ASD HD&GS memo, 6 December 2017, “Proliferation Security Initiative Priorities for FY 2025–2027”

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GLOSSARY

AOR	area of responsibility
CA	Coordinating Authority
CBP	Customs and Border Protection
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCDR	Combatant Commander
CCMD	Combatant Command
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff
CPI	Office of Counterproliferation Initiatives
CWMD	countering weapons of mass destruction
DASW NCWMD	Deputy Assistant Secretary of War for Nuclear Deterrence and Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Policy
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOS	Department of State
DoW	Department of War
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
HLPM	High-Level Political Meeting
IAW	in accordance with
J-2	Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, J-2
J-3	Joint Staff Directorate for Operations, J-3
J-5	Joint Staff Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5
J-7	Joint Staff Directorate for Joint Force Development, J-7
JEP	Joint Exercise Program
LIVEX	live exercise
MLPM	Mid-Level Political Meeting
NDU	National Defense University
NIPRNET	Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network
NWC	Naval War College
O&M	operations and maintenance
OEG	Operational Experts Group
OPR	office of primary responsibility
OSW	Office of the Secretary of War

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PORTEX	port exercise
PSI	Proliferation Security Initiative
SecWar	Secretary of War
SIPRNET	SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
SOIP	Statement of Interdiction Principles
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
USG	U.S. Government
VBSS	visit, board, search, and seizure
WMD	weapons of mass destruction